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Abstract 
With the gain in popularity of the internet in the beginning of this decade, online shopping has 
witnessed a strong growth rate of about 25 percent per year. However, recent reports suggest that 
the growth rate is flattening. One of the key reasons for dwindling growth rate is the rise in 
expectations of the customers. Customers want that the retail websites should help them in finding 
products through recommendations. Therefore it is expected that firms would have higher profits 
by using recommender systems since that will boost their sales. However we show that increased 
profits are guaranteed only if a firm has the monopoly in the market. Market with two firms may 
not witness increased profits for both the firms. We analyze how the improvement in technology of 
recommender system affects the market, the price charged by the firms and therefore their profits.  
 
Keywords:  Analytical modeling, E-business, Economic modeling, Recommendation agent  
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Introduction 
With the gain in popularity of the internet in the beginning of this decade, online shopping has witnessed a strong 
growth rate of about 25 percent per year (Maguire 2005). However, current reports about the future growth of online 
shopping businesses are not as encouraging. Jupiter expects online retailing to dip below double-digit percentage 
growth rates sometime around 2010, and to plateau at some future date after that (Linn 2007). There are several 
reasons for this dwindling growth rate. While the current economic crisis is clearly one of them, other factors are 
playing a significant role in this downward trend. A major contributor for the decline in the growth rate of online 
shopping is changing consumer expectations. A mere web presence is not enough for the firms anymore. Customers 
want a site that is easy to navigate and easy-to find and sort through the products they desire. They want product 
recommendations (Vasquez 2008). 
A retail website generally contains thousands of products, scattered amongst various categories. As opposed to 
brick-and-mortar store, a customer is on her own to find a suitable product out of so many, a task requiring 
considerable time and effort. In such situations, recommender systems can play an important role in elevating the 
customer experience by reducing the search effort imposed on the customer (Häubl and Trifts 2000). A recent 
survey reveals that 77 percent of online shoppers make additional purchases when captivated by personalized cross-
sell and up-sell recommendations (Cell 2008). Personalized recommendations have been found to be an effective 
tool for consumer marketing, building customer loyalty, improving merchandizing and elevating the online customer 
experience (Lovett 2007). 
Since the use of recommender systems reduces the search cost imposed on the customer to find 
a suitable product, it is expected that with use of recommender systems, (i) customers who are already the online 
shoppers should be able to find a product that better fits their needs as compared to a product that they find in the 
absence of the recommender system, and (ii) firms would have higher profits, as customers who were not interested 
in purchasing earlier due to high search cost would also start purchasing. Our goal in this paper is to model the 
search effort impact of recommender systems on the product price and the profit of firms. Our work contributes to 
the literature on recommender systems and helps firms with e-tailing websites in pricing products in the presence of 
recommender systems and ultimately in deciding whether it is good for them to implement a recommender system.  
In a monopoly, we show that it is always profitable for a firm to provide recommendation services to its customers. 
However, product price may increase or decrease. In a duopoly, a better recommender system does not always result 
in increased profit. Once again, product price may increase or decrease.  
Previous literature has looked at several aspects of product customization. For example, Shaffer and Zhang (1995) 
studied how two firm’s coupon targeting strategies impact their pricing strategies and the market structure. Dewan et 
al. (2003) developed a model for determining pricing strategies and degree of product customization. Mendelson and 
Parlaktürk (2008) modeled the duopoly between a mass customization firm and a traditional firm. However, none of 
them considered a market that is heterogeneous in search cost of customers to analyze the impact of reduction in 
search cost. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 considers a monopolistic 
market while Section 4 considers a duopoly. Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes the paper. 
The Model 
In this section, we formalize the parameters, describe the interaction of the website with an online customer and 
setup the model. 
Notation 
We consider a website that provides online recommendations to customers who visit the website. The recommender 
system reduces the search effort imposed on customers while finding a product that suits their needs. A normalized 
parameter r∈[0,1] represents the degree of effectiveness of the recommender system. The customers are 
heterogeneous in their cost associated with one unit search effort denoted by θ∈[a,b], where a, b∈[0,1]. Hence 
depending on the type θ , every customer is willing to spend some effort in searching the right product for herself in 
the website. Therefore, the search space for the customer is the whole website containing all the products. The 
customer has a most preferred product, but in the absence of a recommender system, needs to search the entire 
search space to find this product. Most consumers cannot afford such a high level of search cost. Therefore a 
customer searches a fraction of the search space and purchases the product that is most preferred in that fraction 
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search space that is explored. We represent the entire search space as d, and the fraction of the search space explored 
by the customer as x. We refer to x as the fit of the product with a fit cost of f(x)1. When x is equal to d, the fit cost is 
a minimum. Figure 1 depicts the above idea. 
The parameters for the firm are Π,  which denotes the profit of the firm, q which is the price of the products and N 




Figure 1: Fitness of a product 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes all the parameters required in the model including the ones that are discussed above.  
Table 1: Model Parameters 
x Fit of a product 
d The entire search space 
r Effectiveness of the search engine 
θ Search cost of the customer 
Π Profit of the firm 
q Price of the products in the website 
N Number of customers 
Interaction of a customer with the website 
A customer shops on a retail website that provides product recommendations to her. Recommendation services help 
the customer in finding a product that is closer to her most preferred product, than if there were no recommendation. 
In other words, a recommender system helps the customer in her search process, thereby reducing her search cost. 
The price of all the products in the website is known upfront to all the customers. An example of such a website 
could be itunes. The price of every song in itunes is $0.99 and itunes provide recommendations through its engine 
named “Genius.”  
Apart from q, the effectiveness of the recommender system (r) is known to customers. Since all the parameters are 
known to the customer, depending on the value of θ, she decides whether she should “search and buy” or not initiate 
the search at all by evaluating the surplus that she would have after purchasing the product. Let S be the surplus, C 
be the cost born by the customer after buying the product due to the fit of the product and search required to find the 
product, and R be the reservation price of the product. 
We assume that C is increasing and convex in x and θ. Then, 
             
In this case,  implies  since R and q are constant. Since the product with fitness x is far from the most 
preferred product of the customer, the customer incurs a cost referred as fit cost represented by f(x). Also, while 
searching the product, the customer incurs the search cost represented by g(x, r, θ). The surplus is therefore 
      (1) 
We assume that f(x) is decreasing and convex in x and g(x,r,θ) is increasing and convex in x and θ, while decreasing 
and convex in r. The objective of the customer is to choose x such that the surplus is maximized. The Individual 
Rationality (IR) constraint of the customer is S ≥0. If the IR constraint of the customer is satisfied, the customer 
chooses to “search and buy", else the customer does not search and therefore does not buy. The “Search and buy" 
decision plays an important role in determining the size of the market, which in turn effects the profits of the firms 
and price of the product. In the forthcoming sections, we consider monopolistic and duopolistic markets to analyze 
the recommender system's effectiveness on the profit maximizing price and firm profit. 
                                                          
1 Fit cost is a function of x, where x depends on r andθ. Thus, fit cost is an indirectly a function of r andθ. 
Fit is 0 
x Fit is x 
Fit is d 
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The Monopoly Case 
In this section, we consider a monopolistic firm that employs a commendation for all its customers. As mentioned 
earlier, the objective of the customer is to maximize her surplus. By differentiating equation (1) and equating it to 0, 
we can easily find the optimal fit x*(r, θ) of the product that customer would like to find in order to maximize her 
surplus. It can be shown that the surplus decreases monotonically with increase in θ; we suppress the details because 
of lack of space. Therefore with increase in the value of search type θ, the surplus falls from positive value to 0, and 
after that surplus is negative. The I.R. constraint is tight for a customer whose surplus is 0. Such a customer is the 
marginal customer and her type is denoted by ( ). The value of search type of a marginal customer can 
therefore be found using 
   
Therefore if the type of a customer is θ∈[a,  (r,q)] the customer does “search and buy" and if the type of customer 
is θ∈[  (r,q), b] the customer does not “search and buy". The pool of customers who decide to “search and buy" is 
referred to as the “market”. Thus an analysis of the relationships between  and r and those between q and r and Π 
and r should provide insights about how recommendation systems can affect the market, market price and firm 
profit. Lemma 1 states how   varies with changes in r and q. 
Lemma 1: With increase in r, market will always expand since  increases, whereas with increase in q the market 
always shrinks as   decreases i.e.  and . 
Proof: Details are suppressed because of lack of space. 
The result is intuitive and expected, since with an improvement in the recommendation technology, the search cost 
(g) goes down and hence some customers of type  should now get a positive surplus after searching for and 
purchasing a product, thus causing an increase in the size of the market. On the other hand, from equation (1) we 
infer that the increase in price reduces the surplus to zero from positive for the customers close to the marginal 
customer. As a result, some customers including the marginal customer no more find it beneficial to purchase a 
product from the firm. This should impact the pricing strategy of the firm and its profit, which are discussed in the 
next section.  
Profit of the Monopolist 
The profit of the firm is the product of the market size and the price of the product. We assume that the marginal 
cost of the technology is 0. Also, without loss of generality, we assume the product cost to be zero. Therefore 
                          (2) 
The firm optimizes the profit function to determine the price (q*(r)) of the products by differentiating equation (2) 
and equating it to 0 (details are suppressed due to lack of space). The firm’s objective is to get maximum profits that 
may require the firm to increase or decrease the price of the product in response to improvements in 
recommendation technology (a higher value of r). Part A of Proposition 1 states the condition in which firm would 
increase the price of the products. However, as stated in part B of the proposition, the firm will always have higher 
profits as recommendation technology improves. 
 Proposition 1:  
(A) If  then,   
else if , then 
Case I:  if   
Case II:  if  
(B): Firm profits are always increase in r, i.e.  
Proof: Details are suppressed because of lack of space. 
The above proposition states that if the impact of market size is less than the impact of price at higher levels of 
recommendation technology, the firm should always charge a higher price when recommendation technology 
improves. Otherwise, the firm needs to consider the overall impact of increasing the price and improvements in 
recommendation technology to decide whether to increase or decrease the price. 
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When the price is increased by the firm with increase in r, the firm loses some customers as increase in price reduces 
the size of the market. However, the loss of revenue due to lost market is compensated through increased price that 
leads to higher profit for the firm. On the other hand, if the firm reduces the price of the product, the size of the 
market grows. The profit due to growth in size of the market compensates for the loss due to reduction in price, 
causing increase in the profits of the firm. Therefore, the higher profit is driven by both the price as well as the size 
of the market for the firm. 
The Duopoly Case 
Here we analyze a duopolistic market where there are two competing firms (1 and 2) that serve the market. The 
firms choose prices q1 and q2 and use the recommender systems with effectiveness r1 and r2. For example, Netflix 
and Blockbuster provide recommendations to their customers so that the customers can find the right movie to 
maximize surplus. The product with optimal fit for the same customer in the website of firm 1 may be different from 
the product of optimal fit for the customer in the website of firm 2, since the optimal fit depends on r1 and r2 in 
addition to the customer type θ. 
The customer evaluates her surplus at firm 1 and compares that with the surplus at firm 2 to decide on which firm to 
“search and buy” or not visit either firm. We denote the fit of the product purchased from firm i as xi where i = 1, 2, 
and the price of a product as qi. The surplus the customer generates by purchasing from firm i is Si, the fit cost is 
f(xi), and search cost is g(xi, ri, θ).  
The two firms can have recommender systems with same effectiveness or different effectiveness.  We focus here on 
the case where the firms are asymmetric in the effectiveness of the recommender system technology employed, i.e. 
r1≠r2. We assume that the market is divided into two segments
2 on the basis of search type θ, one segment of the 
market purchases products from firm 1 which provides a surplus (S1) to the customers, and the other segment 
purchases products from firm 2, which provides a surplus (S2) to the customers. We refer to these segments as 
segment I and segment II respectively. In general, if S is the surplus of a customer, then the decision problem of a 
customer can be formulated as 
                                                 (4) 
Such that 
  (I.R. constraint)     (5) 
Similar to the monopoly case, the marginal customer is a customer whose IR constraint is tight, i.e. the surplus of a 
marginal customer is zero after finding a product that maximizes her surplus. Therefore all the customers, whose 
search type is greater that the search type of marginal customer, will not search and buy. Using the I.R. constraint, 
the search type of marginal customer can be found by 
        (6) 
Clearly S1 ≥ S2 for a customer in segment I and S2 ≥ S1 for a customer in segment II. Without loss of generality, 
suppose that the marginal customer is a type II customer. Therefore we refer to the search type of marginal customer 
as . The search type of the marginal customer (r2, q2) can be found using the following equation 
           (7) 
Since there are only two segments in the market, there is only one type of customer with search type  such that 
these customers are indifferent between purchasing products from firm 1 and firm 2. Therefore segment I customers 
are of type  and segment II customers are of type . For an indifferent customer, , i.e.  
 (8) 
Using equation (8), we can find (q1, q2, r1, r2). Figure 2 illustrates the market and the surpluses for the customers 
who purchase products. For illustration purposes, we have shown the surpluses to decrease linearly with θ. 
Using the market share of the firms and the prices of the products sold by the two firms, we can formulate the profit 
function of the two firms as 
                                                                                                                                               (9) 
                                                                                                                                             (10) 
                                                          
2 It is possible to have more than two contiguous segments in the market, such that each alternate segment is served by the same 
firm. The segmentation depends on the IR constraints of the customers. However, for analytical tractability, we assume that the 
market is divided into two segments only. 
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Equation (9) and (10) are used to find (r1, r2, q2) and (r1, r2, q1) by differentiating them with respect to q1 and q2 
respectively and equating them to 0. (r1, r2, q2) and (r1, r2, q1) can be solved simultaneously to find (r1, r2) 
and (r1, r2). Details are suppressed because of lack of space. 
 
Similar to the monopoly case, it can be shown that the price of products charged by the two firms could increase as 
well as decrease with improvements in the recommendation technology employed at these firms. However, unlike 
the monopoly case, we show that an improvement in recommendation technologies does not necessarily increase 
firm profits.   
Own-Technology effect on firm's profits 
The technology impacts the profits of the firms by changing the size of the market and by changing the prices 
charged by the firms. However, unlike the monopoly case, the profit of a firm may go down despite an improvement 
in the recommender system's effectiveness. Of course when improvement in technology causes decrease in profits, 
firms would never improve their technology even if the improvement is free. Proposition 4 states the expression for 
the change in profit with change in technology for both the firms. 
Proposition 2: (A) The rate of change of the profit of the firm 1 with respect to change in effectiveness of their 
recommender system is given by 
  
(B) The rate of change of the profit of the firm 2 with respect to change in effectiveness of their recommender 
system is given by  
  
Proof: Details are suppressed because of lack of space.  
The intuition behind the increase or decrease in profits is hard to visualize using general forms of  and 
. Therefore we introduce specific functional forms for both of them and analyze the results to find the 
reasons for increase and decrease of profits with improvement in technologies.  
We assume  and  .  
Here fit costs decrease linearly with the amount search or the fit level x. The symbol d represents the full search 
space. On the other hand, we allow the search costs to be quadratic in the amount of search and inversely 
proportional to the customer search effort type and the effectiveness of the recommendation system. 
 It can be easily shown that ,  ,  and 
. It can be easily shown that the firm with the better recommender system always 
serves the customers of segment I of Figure 2, and customers of segment 2 are served by the firm with the inferior 
recommender system. Hence, . Using the profits functions  and  described above, we find that . 
By taking the second derivative we find that  and maximizes the profits of firm 1 and firm 2, respectively, 
when . Details are suppressed due to lack of space.  








Surplus from products of firm 1 
Surplus from products of firm 2 
Customers 
of firm 1 
Customers 
of firm 2 
                                                     
 
Figure 2: Market segments of firm 1 and firm 2 
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 and .  
Differentiating the profit functions with respect to  and  respectively, we get 
 , and 
    (11) 
From equation (11), it can be inferred that, 
<0 if .   (12) 
When  is not very large the condition in (12) is an implication of the diminishing rate of returns of the 
improvement in the technology of the recommender system. Assuming that  is constant, then the profits of firm 1 
starts falling after a threshold value of , which can be found from equation (12). The reason is that firm 1 can 
increase the price of its products with increase in  is that at smaller values of  the market is less sensitive to 
increase in price than improvement in technology. This is similar to the monopoly case. Further it can be shown that 
it is always optimal for firm 1 to increase the price of its products with improvement in technology. However 
increase in price also shrinks the market. After the threshold value of , a further decrease of market hurts the firm, 
leading to reduction in profits.  
When ( ), the customers are highly sensitive to the price as they are not willing to pay a high price for the 
products. So the improvement in technology leading to increase in price beyond a point always hurts the firm. 
Therefore the firm should not further improve the technology once the threshold is reached. 
The profits of firm 2 decreases with increase in profits if  
.  
This condition holds when the firm 2’s technology is much inferior as compared to firm 1 and when .  It can 
be shown that firm 1 always reduces the price of its products when firm 2 improves its technology. Since  is a 
high, customers of firm 1 are more sensitive to price than the technology of firm 1, and a reduction in price increases 
its market. As a result the market for firm 2 reduces leading to lower profits for firm 2. Therefore firm 2 should not 
improve its technology till it can closely match firm 1 in terms of technology. When , it can be shown to be 
optimal for firm 2 to charge a higher price. However, a higher price shrinks the market for firm 2 since customers 
are not willing to pay high price for the products. Therefore, the profits of firm 2 decreases with increase in 
recommender system technology. In such a case firm 2 should not improve its technology further. 
Cross-Technology effect on firm's profits 
As stated earlier, the improvement in technology by one firm affects the optimal pricing decision and market share 
of other firm, so naturally the profit of other firm is also impacted. Therefore it would be interesting to see the 
change in profit of one firm because of change in technology of the other firm. Proposition 5 states the expressions 
for rate of change of profits of one firm with respect to the change in effectiveness of recommender system of the 
other firm. 
Proposition 3: (A) The rate of change of the profit of the firm 1 with respect to change in effectiveness of 
recommender system of firm 2 is given by 
  
(B) The rate of change of the profit of the firm 2 with respect to change in effectiveness of recommender system of 
firm 1 is given by 
  
Proof: Details are suppressed because of lack of space. 
We know that  , but the signs of other derivatives can be either positive or negative. Therefore, we use the 
same functional forms introduced in the previous section to illustrate the above trends. It can be shown that  
  and  
  
The above result is expected for firm 1. As firm 2 improves its technology, it gets closer to firm 1 in terms of 
technology thereby pushing the firm to engage in a price war, leading to reduced profits for firm 1. On the other 
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hand, interestingly, improvement in r1 always benefits firm 2 because improvement in r1 increases the gap between 
the technologies thereby reducing the chances of price war by creating a differentiated market.   
However, the functional form assumed here is limited and incapable to show that the profits of firm 1 and 2 can also 
increase with improvement in technology of firm 2 and 1 respectively.  
Conclusions, limitations and future research 
This work is an attempt to understand the impact of recommender systems on purchasing behavior of online 
shoppers in terms of their decisions of search and buy the product or not doing so by analyzing the impact on the 
market size and prices charged by the firms for their products. This research answers some important questions 
relevant to managers of retail website regarding adoption of recommender system, or improving the existing 
technology. We have done a quantitative analysis of the role of recommendation technology in increasing the profits 
of the firms using recommender systems. We showed that the firms will always realize higher profits in a monopoly, 
however increased profits are not guaranteed for the firms in a duopoly, even if the marginal cost of technology is 
zero. The prices of the products can increase or decrease with adoption of better recommender system in both cases. 
More analysis of the cases and some more specific functional forms need to be investigated to gain a deeper 
understanding of the profit impacts of recommendation technologies. Also, it would be interesting to examine 
customer surplus and societal surplus, and how these change with improvements in recommendation technology. In 
future, we intend to address these questions. Also we will consider the case of multiple products (within different 
prices) that share the same recommendation system. 
In future, we will analyze the impact of considering the cost of recommendation on the profits of the firms. 
Currently, we have treated recommendation effectiveness as an exogenous parameter for the two firms. We will also 
analyze the changes in profits while treating them as endogenous. 
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